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RECENT PUBLICATIONS 
The New Deal Lawyers. By Peter H. Irons. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 320. $27.50, cloth. 
The government lawyers who helped shape and defend New 
Deal agencies have received little attention from scholars. Any 
oversight has now, however, been redressed. The New Deal 
Lawyers provides a detailed and careful study of the litigation 
process that preceded the New Deal's 1937 court triumphs. Peter 
Irons' book focuses on the activities of three key agencies and 
their general counsels: the National Recovery Administration 
(NRA) and Donald Richberg; the Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration (AAA) and Jerome Frank; and the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) and Charles Fahy. Each lawyer had a 
distinctive style, and not surprisingly, the author concludes that 
the counsel's style determined how his agency responded to con-
stitutional challenges. Richberg tried to use political pressure to 
settle disagreements. Frank preferred negotiation to litigation; as 
originally structured, his office did not even have a litigation sec-
tion. Fahy alone stressed the importance of gaining court ap-
proval of his agency. NLRB lawyers carefully selected test cases, 
engaged in forum-shopping, and wrote sharply focused briefs 
designed to present issues in a favorable light to a generally 
hostile judiciary. 
In the end, all three agencies faced Supreme Court review. 
The Court in 1935 held the NRA unconstitutional in United 
States v. Schechter Poultry Corp. 1 A year later, the AAA was 
overturned in United States v. Butler.2 But, in a series of 1937 
cases beginning with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3 
the Court gave its sanction to the NLRB. The New Deal Lawyers 
recounts the manner in which, willingly or unwillingly, the agen-
cies advanced toward these critical courtroom showdowns. 
Drawing on his examination of surviving legal records and 
interviews with New Dealers, Irons has written a careful study of 
I 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
2 297 u.s. 1 (1936). 
3 30 u.s. 1 (1937). 
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what New Deal lawyers did in the first years of the Roosevelt 
administration. He shows how they prepared and argued their 
cases. He also discusses the bureaucratic obst_acles agency attor-
neys confronted. Administrators often viewed the lawyers they 
employed with suspicion. George Peek of the AAA, for example, 
considered Frank's staff to be "boys with their hair ablaze" and 
sought to limit their authority. At the same time, the conservative 
Justice Department succeeded in winning from the agencies a 
measure of control over the litigation process. Irons makes clear 
that agency lawyers faced some of their most ardent foes not in 
the courtroom but in government offices. 
But what Irons does not fully articulate is why the subject of 
this book is worthy of attention. The New Deal Lawyers is not a 
study of how the New Deal itself ultimately won Court approval. 
Irons apparently accepts the premise that the Court finally 
yielded not to the power of legal arguments, but to the force of 
Roosevelt's national support. Similarly, Irons acknowledges it 
was not sloppy legislative draftsmanship or inadequate trial 
preparation which caused the invalidation of the AAA and the 
NRA. Rather, the composition of the Supreme Court made in-
validation inevitable. The legacy of the New Deal lawyers, then, 
cannot be determined by looking at judicial results. 
If they had a legacy, it must be found by placing their activi-
ties in a larger political and legal context. Irons does not attempt 
to do this. Instead, he provides only a narrative of events. Irons 
asserts in his preface that "[t]he process of litigation that leads to 
momentous Supreme Court decisions is a topic deserving of 
historical study." Yet, he never satisfactorily explains why he 
believes this to be true or why the litigation surveyed merits such 
close analysis. Thus The New Deal Lawyers fills a historiographi-
cal gap, but the reader wonders why Irons bothered. 
All this is not to suggest, however, that Irons' subject lacks 
importance. With the advent of the New Deal, a "plague" of 
young lawyers arrived in Washington. Many remained to shape 
American legal and political history for a generation. Undoubted-
ly, their initial experiences influenced their attitudes toward the 
role of law and government, but Irons only briefly explores this 
subject. In addition, he does not explore the effects of New Deal 
agency activities on legal thinking and jurisprudence. This is an 
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important issue because so many government lawyers, Frank be-
ing the most prominent, were legal realists, and presumably were 
anxious to put their theories into practice. Irons offers little in-
sight into these larger questions, and his focus on only three 
attorneys makes it difficult to discern broad continuities and 
changes. As a result, despite Irons' careful research and analysis, 
The New Deal Lawyers is unsatisfying and of limited value. 
-William Treanor 
